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ABSTMCT 
F l i g h t  crews can never be e n t i r e l y  cer 
the s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h o i r  f l i g  
set of 
cohe ren t  picture of what is happ 
many r o u t i n e  si tuations,  those theories accord  so c l o s e l y  wi th  r e a l i t y ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  is l i t t l e  sti 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
t h e  chances of error i n  t h e  theory  become much higher .  
o u t  the . v a l i d i t y  and 
The s k i l l s  and 
w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  a f l i g h t  crew to be  alert to  possible errors i n  t h e  theo ry  
become critical to t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to ensu re  a safe 
f l i g h t .  
The paper i d e n t i f i e s  s e v e r a l  major factors t h a t  determine the  l ikelihood 
t h a t  a f a u l t y  theo ry  w i l l  be detected and r e v i s e d :  
1. The 'theories of practice' t h a t  pilots have developed through 
t r a i n i n g  and experience-and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  degree  to  which 
t h o s e  t h e o r i e s  b u i l d  i n  inqu i ry  and t e s t i n g  i n  s i t ua t ions  of 
confus ion ,  anomaly, and crisis. 
2. The abilities of crew members t o  combine s k i l l s  i n  advocacy 
and inqui ry .  
3.. The management s k i l l s  and s t y l e  of t h e  cap ta in .  
4. The degree  to  which t h e  role system i n  t h e  c o c k p i t  is w e l l  
understood, and procedures  for role-modificati 
shared.  
l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  of p 
t they  r e c e i v e  training i n  a l l  o 
lane .  But it is e q u a l l y  cri t ical  tha t  they  
i z e  t h e i r  own h i s t o r i c  p a t t e r n s  for l e a r n i n g ,  for r e l a t i n g  
They need to understand how to combine 
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authority with learning, fast response t 
and c l a r i t y  with wil l ingnass 
dynamics o f  role systems, how to create an e f f e c t i v e  and mutually under- 
stood set of role relat ionships,  and how to modify those relat ionships 
quickly without creating confusion, overlaps and gaps. 
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---The crew of a 1011 d i scove r s  dur ing  an approach t h a t  t h e  l i g h t  
and begin to  circle while  
The crew apparent ly  assume 
on their nose gear is n o t  on, 
a t tempt ing  t o  correct t h e  problem. 
that a l t i t u d e  is  being monitored, b u t  f a i l  to d e t e c t  an unintended 
descent .  
k i l l e d ,  and 77 ottiers are in jured .  
"lie plane  crashes on a clear n ight ,  99 people  are 
In each case, the c a p t a i n  (or the e n t i r e  crew) was, operac ing  on the 
b 
basis of a ' theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n '  -0 a s e t  of b e l i e f s  about what w a s  
happening and what; a c t i o n s  it w a s  appropriate to take. 
was data a v a i l a b l e  to i n d i c a t e  that  t h e  theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was i n  
error. In t h e  f i r s t  case, t h e  con t r ad ic to ry  data was assumed away. In the 
second case, t h e  crew d i d  n o t  seek d a t a  t h a t  might have alerted them to  
their error. 
I n  each case, t h e r e  
I n  t h e  third, the  c r e w  focused so heav i ly  on  one element 
of the s i t u a t i o n  ( t h e  nose gear l i g h t ) ,  that they ina t t ended  to e a s i l y  
available data that would have a l e r t e d  them to a serious problem. f n  each 
2. taint  n ro  the factor:; i n  fnckqrouncl and exjx?riencc. which in f luence  
t h e  TOS t h a t  a p i l o t  is l i k e l y  to use? 
3. How can educa t ion  and t ra in i i iq  a c t i v i t i e s  reduce tho p r o b a b i l i t y  
of errors i n  a TOS? 
4.  What are t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
that pilots w i l l  recoqnize errors i n  t h e i r  TOS? 
A. What de te rmines  t h e  theory  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n ?  
The TOS is a short-term theory  used by a n  i n d i v i d u a l  to ana lyze  and 
make d e c i s i o n s  about  t h e  immediate environment. 
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  TOS's change c o n t i n u a l l y .  Thc TOS "I am is? 
As i n d i v i d u a l s  move through 
t h e  sllpermarket buying food' is  very d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  TOS 'b a m  landing  
a 727 under very d i f f i c u l t  weather cond i t ions ' .  Iiuman e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
ddpends heav i ly  on the degree  of correspondence between a TOS and t h e  
environment. Error occurs when a TQS and t h e  environmont are mismatshcd. 
An example is t h e  case i n  which t h e  crew assumed t h a t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  must be 
'h 
s a f e  because they had a l r e a d y  rece ived  approach c l e a r a n c e  from ground 
c o n t r o l .  
The TOS t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  u ses  i n  any g iven  s i t u a t i o n  is determined 
by long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  person, short- term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and by t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  two. 
W e  can divide t h e  long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the person  i n t o  two 
m a j o r . c a t e g o r i e s r  (1) fundamental c o g n i t i v e  and behav io ra l  parameters  i n  
humanst (2) t h e  ' theory of practice' t h a t  informs t h e  behavior  of a 
particular ind iv idua l .  The latter may be viewed as a long-term theory  
(i.e., a theory  which is r e l a t i v e l y  stable, and evo lves  on ly  through 
r e l a t i v e l y  s l o w ,  developmental  p rocesses) .  The ' t heory  o f  practice' is 
used by the individual to des ign ,  test and implement ' t h e o r i e s  of t h e  
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situation'. Without a theory  o f  practice, t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  could not 
have any cohe ren t  understanding o f  a s i t u a t i o n .  
1. 
There are very impor tan t  l i m i t s  ' 
a t t e n d  to o n l y  a very l i m i t e d  number of discrete phenomena a t  any one 
t i m e ,  and have very s e v e r e  limits on short-term memory. Wfaa 
a ' d i s c r e t e  phenomenon' is heav i ly  dependent on prior Pcarning. f 
n o t  a pi lot ,  and when I look a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s  on  an  a i r p l a n e  (even a very 
s m a l l ,  p r o p e l l o r  p l a n e ) ,  I f i n d  t h e  e n t i r e  t h i n g  confusing.  I have never 
learned a set  of ' p a t t e r n s '  t h a t  would enable  
:-LA.nber of discrete b i t s  o f  in format ion  i n t o  a 
A t r a i n e d  pi lot  could look a t  t h e  ins t ruments  
m e  t o  o rgan ize  a large 
s i n g l e ,  organized concept. 
f o r  a few seconds, and would 
i 
know a g r e a t  deal about t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  p lane .  Y could look a t  the 
same ins t rumen t s  f o r  s e v e r a l  hours,  and s t i l l  know almost nothing.  
P a t t e r n s  or concepts  are stored i n  long- t em memory, add require time 
and e f f o r t  to l ea rn .  Once learned ,  however, they  can  be used with  
enormous speed and accuracy. The pi lot  who 'seems to hawe a s i x t h  sense  
f o r  knowing j u s t  what 's  happening at any g iven  mment' is a p i l o t  who 
has a c q u i r e d  o v e r  t i m e  a n  unusual ly  powerful set of c o g n i t i v e  p a t t e r n s .  
While a p a t t e r n  is be ing  l ea rned ,  t h e  pilot needs to  spend a cons ide rab le  
amount of time consc ious ly  and e x p l i c i t l y  a t t e n d i n g  to t h e  information 
subsumed by t h e  pattern. It  is a slow, se l f -consc ious  p r o c e s s  of 
t t e r n ,  and s t o r i n g  the p a t t e r n  
i n  long- te r  Once t h e  p a t t e r n  is well- learned,  howevero it can 
be used quickly and with no cons u s  a t t e n t i o n  a t  all. The i 
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c-m use t h o  p a t t e r n  wi thout  th inking  about  it, and may no t  be a b l e  to 
i d e n t i f y  what p a t t e r n  lie is usinq.  
The behavioral equivalr?nt: to a patt.arn is a ' !3kll ls .  Ju:%t as a 
p a t t e r n  is b u i l t  up throuqh thc o r g a n i z a t i o n  of a number of discrete b i t s  
of informat ion ,  a s k i l l  i s  b u i l t  up through t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of a number 
of discfcete, molecular behaviors  i n t o  a molar p a t t e r n .  Learning a s k i l l  
r e q u i r e s  time, effort, practice, and thought.  
it can  be used i n  t h e  same way as a well- learned p a t t e r n  - qu ick ly ,  
e f f o r t l e s s l y ,  and t a c i t l y .  
t h a t  it become tacit  -- t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  is no longer  consc ious  of t h e  
But once  t h e  s k i l l  is l ea rned ,  
I t  is i n  fact e s s e n t i a l  to s k i l l e d  performance 
i n d i v i d u a l  components of t h e  s k i l l .  Consciousness of t h o s e  components 
would r e t a r d  or even d i s r u p t  t h e  execut ion  of t h e  s k i l l .  
i s  typ ing  s k i l l .  
A simple example 
I can  type much more r a p i d l y  than  I c h  w r i t e  %Onghand, 
b u t  my t yp ing  rate s l o w s  down by about  90% i f  I t r y  t o  t h i n k  about  which 
f i n g e r  I w i l l  u se  to type  each letter. My speed w i l l  also d e c l i n e  (and 
I w i l l  make more errors) i f  I t r y  to type  a t e x t  c o n s i s t i n g  of nonsense 
s y l l a b l e s  or w r i t t e n  i n  an  un fami l i a r  f o r e i g n  language. 
c o n d i t i o n s  is o u t s i d e  of my s k i l l  range. 
E i t h e r  of t hose  
With practice, I could  l e a r n  
to  type  nonsense s y l l a b l e s  o r  Swedish t ex t s  wi th  h igh  e f f i c i e n c y ,  but as 
y e t  I have fe l t  no need t o  develop e i t h e r  s k i l l .  
The major i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e s e  parameters for pi lot ing an  a i r p l a n e  
are : 
1. The c a p a c i t y  of a p i lo t  to  cope wi th  i n c r e a s i n g  complex 
a i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  depend on t h e  patterns and s k i l l s  that the 
pilot has developed. 
2. When s i t u a t i o n s  occur  which go outside of l e a r n e d  p a t t e r n s  
and s k i l l s ,  t h e  pi lot ' s  performance w i l l  s l o w  markodiy, and 
the r i s k  of c o g n i t i v e  or behav io ra l  overload w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
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markedly. 
z , 
2 ,  Theor ies  of P r a c t i c e  
Earlier, I introduced tho  no t ion  o f  a TOS, which is short- term and 
(This  is supported by the  work of Ruffell Smith, 1979.) 
: 
s i t u a t i o n a l ,  and a theory  o f  p r a c t i c e  (TOP), which is more g e n e r a l  and 
longer-term. A pilot 's  TOS changes c o n t i n u a l l y  d u r i n g  a s i n g l e  f l i g h t ;  
t h e  pi lot ' s  TOP (i-e. ,  concepts  and s k i l l s  f o r  f l y i n q  a n  a i r p l a n e )  
changes very l i t t l e  dur ing  a t y p i c a l  f l i q h t .  
The TOS and TOP are fmth examples of ' t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n '  (Argyris 
and Schon, 1974; Bolman, 1974). Humans always operate i n  environments 
that are so complex t h a t  it is d i f f i c u l t  or imposs ib le  to  a t t e n d  to 
every th ing .  The q u e s t i o n  arises: h o w  do they  select? The a c t i o n -  
t h e o r e t i c  proposa l  is t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  develop theories f o r  action; 
c o g n i t i v e  and behav io ra l  frameworks t h a t  gu ide  them i n  dccit l inq what 
i 
variables to a t t e n d  to, w h a t  in format ion  t o  seek, w h a t  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
to expec t ,  and what a c t i o n s  to  take.  The p i t t e r n  and r e g u l a r i t y  i n  any 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior  is seen  as s t o m i n g  from a learned program that 
informs t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cho ices  and, i f  a c c u r a t e l y  described, can  be 
used to predict the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior. 
T h a t  program, or t heo ry  for action, can be viewed as c o n t a i n i n g  f o u r  
major components: 
1. C o r e  values:  basic criteria for making choices. 
2. Beliefs: b e l i e f s  or hypotheses about  the experienced world, 
i n c l u d i n g  beliefs a b u t  o n e s e l f ,  about o n e ' s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  role, 
about  people, about  s i t u a t i o n a l  con t ingenc ie s ,  etc. 
3 . S k i l l s i  l ea rned  behavior  p a t t e r n s .  
4. Outcomes: consequences of behavior ,  which feed back to i n f l u e n c e  
8 mdify, disconf i rm)  e x i s t i n g  core va lues ,  assumptions, 
and s k i l l s .  
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Argyr is  and Schon (1374) d i s t i n g u i s h  t w o  ve r s ions  of t h e  theory  t h a t  
The espoused theory  r e p r e s e n t s  an  informs an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behavior.  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  own explana t ion  or  account of h i s  or her  behavior;  it is t h e  
consc ious ,  c o g n i t i v e  map t h a t  an ind iv idua l  uses  to e x p l a i n  and to p r e d i c t  
h i s  or h e r  own behavior.  The theory-in-use is  the thcory  that v a l i d l y  
predicts w h a t  a n  ind iv idua l  w i l l  do; it is  t h e  implici t  program that 
guides  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  clioicos. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory and theory-in-use is v i t a l  
The espaused theory  because t h e  t w o  are o f t e n  d i f f e r e n t  or d i sc repan t .  
is n e c e s s a r i l y  incomplete for one reason a l r eady  d iscussed:  
to ski l led behavior  t h a t  cons ide ra t ion  of d e t a i l s  become t ac i t  and subsumed 
under a c o g n i t i v e  p a t t e r n  o r  behaviora l  s k i l l .  tlore troublesome than 
incompleteness of t h e  espoused theory  is i r r e l e v a n c e  o rh i r ec t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
between espoused theory  and theory-in-use. 
i n d i v i d u a l s  are unaware of important  elements of t h e i r  behavior ,  and a r e  
u n r e l i a b l e  i n  desc r ib ing  and p r e d i c t i n g  the i r  behavior.  
A b a s i c  reason t h e  t w o  t h e o r i e s  are o f t e n  d i s c r e p a n t  i s  t h a t  they 
it is e s s e n t i a l  
Under those  circumstances,  
were l ea rned  i n  response to  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  environmental  cont inqencies .  
Espoused theory  is o f t e n  shaped as much or more by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of 
p o s i t i v e  s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n  as by accuracy of se l f -p re sen ta t ion .  
in-use is shaped by environmental  responses  to s p e c i f i c  behavior.  
as a child t o  espouse honesty as a g e n e r a l  value, and was n o t  t a u g h t  to 
say  about  myself ,  " S o m e t i m e s  I lie." But I was also t augh t  t h a t  t h e r e  
were. c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which I was expected to l ie .  I was f u r t h e r  
t augh t  not: to t a l k  about the possible discrepancy between t h c  gene ra l  
Theory- 
1 l earned  
va lue  of honesty and t h e  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s  in which I w a s  expected to 
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bi: dishones t .  Under those  cond i t ions ,  it is r e l a t i v e l y  easy  for m e  to  
develop an espoused view of myself as honest ,  and a theory-in-use t h a t  is 
only  p a r t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  espoused theory.  
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory  and theory-in-use implies 
an  epistemological d i s t i n c t i o n  among three d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of knowing. 
Knowledge is  ' i n t e l l e c t u a l '  when it ex i s t s  i n  t h e  espoused theory  b u t  no t  
i n  t h e  theory-in-use: 
b u t  cannot  do it. Knowledge is ' tacit '  when it e x i s t s  i n  the theory-in- 
use b u t  n o t  t h e  espoused theory:  the person can do it, b u t  cannot  exp la in  
how it is  done. Knowledge is ' i n t e g r a t e d '  when t h e r e  is  synchrony between 
espoused theory  and theory-in-use: 
' 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  can  th ink  about  it and t a l k  about  it, 
t h e  person can both th ink  it and do it. 
D i f f e r e n t  forms o f  educat ion are l i k e l y  to produce d i f f e r e n t  forms of 
knowledge. 'Academic educat ion '  -- i n  which l e a r n e r s  t h i n k  about  and 
d i s c u s s  t h e  practice environment, bu t  do n o t  perform wi th in  it 0- is l i k e l y  
to produce changes i n  espoused theory,  b u t  no corresponding changes i n  
theory-in-use. The r e s u l t  is i n t e l l e c t u a l  knowledge, b u t  t h e  knowledge 
may bo useless or even harmful if t h e  knowledge is abstracted a t  a l e v e l  
too f a r  removed from practice, i f  a p p l i c a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  s k i l l s  t h a t  t h e  
, l ea rne r s  have no t  developed, or if s u c c e s s f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n  is blocked 
by t h e  l e a r n e r ' s  l a c k  o f  self-awareness.  
may h e l p  t h e  l e a r n e r  to become more i n c o n s i s t e n t  and se l f - con t r ad ic to ry ,  
I n  t h e  extreme, t h e  educa t ion  
r a t h e r  t han  more e f f e c t i v e .  
' F i e l d  educat ion '  places 
environment, and requires t h e  
t h e  l e a r n e r  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  practice 
l e a r n e r  to  perform w i t h i n  it, But the 
f i e l d  may n o t  r equ i r e ,  and may prevent ,  t h e  l e a r n e r ' s  
performance. Thus, t h e  f i e l d  is an ideal s e t t i n g  f o r  
r e f l e c t i o n  o n  t h e i r  
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
' t a c i t '  knowledge. 
i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  environment, b u t  may no t  be f u l l y  aware of t h e  s k i l l s  they 
have developcd, a id  of  p o s s i b l e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e i r  s k i l l  repertoire. 
The l e a r n e r s  develop s k i l l s  which enable  them to cope 
It is cons ide ra t ions  l i k e  t h e s e  t h a t  have led many t r a i n i n g  o rgan iza t ions  
to attempt t o  i n t e g r a t e  academic, f i e l d ,  and ' s imu la to r '  t r a i n i n g  so as to 
d e v e l o p ' p r a c t i t i o n e r s  who are se l f -consc ious  and s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e  about  
t h e i r  practice, and who also have t h e  s k i l l s  needed f o r  e f f e c t i v e  performance. 
But such programs do n o t  always pay adequate  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused theory  and theory-in-use, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
incons is tency  between t h e  t w o ,  and the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  problems which may 
res\zlt. 
aspects o f  their theory-in-use, any o f  s e v e r a l  processes are o f t e n  a t  work: 
1. The i nd iv idua l  is unable to  acknowledge the dihcrepancy ' 
(because of t h e  anx ie ty  t h a t  t h e  discrepancy creates), 
and w i l l  defend a g a i n s t  any information sugges t ing  t h a t  
a discrepancy exis ts ,  
When i n d i v i d u a l s  are unable  to desc r ibe  a c c u r a t e l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
2 .  The gaps between espoused theory  and theory-in-use m y  
gene ra t e  l e a r n i n g  errors, p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  
and s e l f - s e a l i n g  processes. ( I f ,  f o r  example, I believe 
I a m  being p l e a s a n t  and f r i e n d l y  when o t h e r s  pe rce ive  m e  
as cool and aggress ive ,  t h e r e  is a good p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
I w i l l  m i s i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  responses  to m e  as evidence 
of t h e i r  personal d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  r a t h e r  than as a p p r o p r i a t e  
responses  to  my behavior.) 
3. There may be c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  theory-in-use t h a t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  does' n o t  recognize,  b u t  which create confusion 
f o r  o t h e r s .  
same person t h e  fol lowing t w o  messages: (1) you should get 
o u t  and t a k e  more i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  l ife;  (2) you are too weak 
and incompetent to  get anywhere. I f  I f a i l  to  recognize  t h e  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  (because I feel t h e r e  is a c o n s i s t e n t  message 
t h a t  says 'get o u t  and do more to  overcome your weaknesses ') ,  
I may create double-binds f o r  t h e  o t h e r  person, y e t  blame 
the other person for n o t  responding i n  a more positive way 
to my e f f o r t s  to  help.) 
(Suppose t h a t  I a m  c o n t i n u a l l y  sendinq to t h e  
The impl i ca t ion  is t h a t  any educa t iona l  program which aspires to  
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c e s s f u l  practice must help l e a r n e r s  to  understand t h e i r  
espoused t h e o r i e s  and t h e i r  theories- in-use,  and 
between t h e  two. 
An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  theo  in-use is t h e  o v e r a l l  program f o r  t h e  des' 
o f  behavior ,  from which a l l  o t h e r  t h e o r i e s  ( inc luding  t h e  espoused theory)  
are derived.  
deve lop  a t  b i r t h ,  and g radua l ly  evolves  through t h e  i n d i v i d u a l e s  l i f e .  A 
program l ea rned  over so long a per iod  of t i m e  is heav i ly  over learned ,  and 
The theory-in-use is a long-term program, which begins  to  
can be altered only through l e a r n i n g  exper iences  which extend over cons ide rab le  
periods of time. I n  any short- term l e a r n i n g  exper ience  (e.g., an experience 
of a f e w  hours), t h e  theory-in-use is  j u s t  short of una l t e rab le .  
I have d i scussed  t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n  a t  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  l eve l s :  
the theory-in-use, t h e  theory  of practice, and t h e  theoky of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n .  The relationship among t h e  t h r e e  is  h i e r a r c h i c a l ,  and can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  f i g u r e  below: 
TH EO RY-I N-USE 
TOPA 
A 
ToSAl T0SA2 
sists o f  t h e  
which provide d 
TOPS 
A 
ToSBl T0SB2 
core values ,  beliefs, and strategies 
uniqueness to  eve i n g  t h a t  I do. 
The theory-in-use a r of 
TOPS for di f f e  e arenas.  For examp f o r  d r i v i n g  
an automobil es. My TOP for automobile 
driving incorporates a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  TOS's (e.g,, ' I  am park ing  my 
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c a r ' ,  'I a m  d r i v i n g  5 m i l e s  above t h e  speed l i m i t ' ) .  
S ince  a TOP is u s u a l l y  learned  after an  i n d i v i d u d ' s  theory-in-use 
is wal l -es tab l i shed ,  t h e  theory  o f  practice w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  inf luenced  
by t h e  prev ious  theory-in-use. 
to  be d i f f e r e n t  for d i f f e r e n t  e lements  o f  t h e  practice environment. ,Some 
areas of t h e  practice environment--par t icular ly  t h e  h ighly  t e c h n i c a l  areas-- 
The na tu re  o f  t h a t  influence i s  bikehy 
are l i k e l y  to  be r e l a t i v e l y  unfami l ia r  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  
problems f o r  which t h e  theory-in-use has  n o t  dcvelopcd. established rou t ines .  
Learning i n  such areas is nore a ques t ion  of adding new ct2ements t o  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  theory  than o f  a l t c r i n q  elements  which are aE.rcady p r e s e n t ,  
Other areas of the practice environment -- p a r t i c u l a r l y  those d,oaling wi th  
communications, i n t e r p e r s o n a l  in f luence ,  and managcnent of'' l:.man resources  -- 
r e p r e s e n t  areas i n  which ove r l ea rn ing  has a l r eady  oecurkad, and the e x i s t i n g  
theory-in-use is r e l a t i v e l y  d i f f i c u l t  to alter. This can lead to misleading 
They r e p r e s e n t  
assumptions l i k e ,  "You can t each  a man t o  f l y ,  b u t  you $can never teach  him 
to  lead. H e ' s  e i t h e r  got it, or he doesn ' t ."  
i n d i v i d u a l  cannot  l e a r n  about  leadersh ip ;  it is j u s t  that new l eade r sh ip  
skills are d i f f i c u l t  to  acqu i re  because they  r e q u i r e  extexaaiwe r e v i s i o n s  
i n  a theory  which is a l r eady  overlearned.  
The problem As not t h a t  t h e  
The q u e s t i o n  then  becomes under what c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  an i n d i v i d u a l  
r e v i s e  a theory.  
a dilemma t h a t  is always present .  
developed is always c o s t l y - i t  r e q u i r e s  t im, energy, effort and, o f t e n ,  
emotional stress. 
Marris (1975) calls t h e  tendency to hold  on to  our e x i s t i n g  t h e o r i e s  
To understand t h i s  i s s u e ,  it is important  ta recognize  
Revision of a theory  that i o  a l r e a d y  
the 'conserva t ive  impulse ' ,  and argues  t h a t  it is i n t r i n s i c  to t h e  human 
capac i ty  to su rv ive  and l e a r n  from experience:  
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(The conse rva t ive  iinlnilse) i s  a cond i t ion  of siirlij ~ ~ a l .  i n  any 
s i t u a t i o n ,  w t m  for t l w  i w o t l  rdcl iwl  iirnovalor. \$t? t ~ r ~ i ~ i ~ ~ > t -  a c t  
without some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of what is going on about u s ,  and t o  
i n t e r p r e t  i t ,  w e  f i r s t  match i t  with somethi 
di!;covcry is lie I W X ~ ,  i l l  a HC 
p r c t a t i o n s  which g radua l ly  consol ida te .  . . i n t o  an  under~tandhq  
o f  l i f e .  Hence, thcrc is a deap-seated impulse i n  aXR uf us to 
defend t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  w h a t  w e  have l earned ,  for wit!iL_”v:i: i ~ .  w e  
would be he lp le s s .  (Marris, p. 10) 
’ (T)he  experience of psychoanalyt ic  t rea tment  sucrgcjests that it 
is  s l o w ,  p a i n f u l  and d i f f i c u l t  for an  a d u l t  to r c c o n s t x w t  a 
r a d i c a l l y  d i f  f c r e n t  way of sec ing  l i f e ,  however needle 
h i s  preconcept ions makc h i m .  In t h i s  sense ,  w e  are al l r  pxoSoundPy 
conse rva t ive ,  and f e e l  immediately th rea t ened  i f  oux bn-;;.c assumptions 
aiid emotional a t tachments  are threa tened .  (Marris, p. 1%) 
So w e  f i n d  innumerable examples o f  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which an Lndividual,  
a group, or a na t ion  c l i n g s  d e s p e r a t e l y  to  a theory  which 6% sm Longer 
working, r a t h e r  t han  to r i s k  t h e  unce r t a in ty ,  ambiguity asad h s s  of meaning 
t h a t  would come from abandoning a f a m i l i a r  way of interpxatd,ng the world. 
A teacher who has  been t each ing  t h e  same grade i n  t h e  same way for many 
.b 
yea r s  is asked by h i s  s u p e r i o r s  t o  adopt a new pedagogy. 
of himself  and h i s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  as a t e a c h s r  i s  attached to h i s  old ways, 
t h e  change is profoundly threat.ening. It would take great effort and time 
for him t o  l e a r n  a new approach, and he is n o t  a t  a l l  s u r e  %laat. he  w i l l  
feel comfortable  and e f f e c t i v e  even i f  he can l e a r n  it. 
If his sense 
The example i l lustrates  a pervas ive  dilemma - it is o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  
to know i n  advance whether it is u s e f u l  i n  a given  s i t u a t i o n  t o  con t inue  
t o  use t h e  theo ry  I have (and save t h e  costs associated wi th  re-design), 
or to re-design (and save 
theory) .  Taking account  o h i s  dilemma, we can  assert several propositions 
about  
costs associated wi th  error i n  my p r e s e n t  
an  ind iv idua l ’ s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  engage i n  theory- 
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rdv i s ion r  
I, The more c e n t r a l  a theory  is to t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  se l f -concept  
and self-esteem, the  less l i k c l y  t h a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  w i l l  r ev i se .  
(Returning to  an earlier example, viewing myself as 'honest '  has  
become so c e n t r a l  to my va lu ing  of  myself, t h a t  I find it d i f f i c u l t  
even to cons ider  modifying t h a t  p a r t  o f  my theory  ahout  myself.) 
2 .  The mre a t h e o r y  is  'overlearned '  (i.e., t h e  more t h a t  I have 
' e x p e r i e n c e s ) ,  t h e  less l i k e l y  is t he  theory  t o  be xevised. 
l ea rned  the same t h i n g  through i t e r a t i o n s  o f  the same or similar 
3. Thc mre t h a t  i nqu i ry  and l e a r n i n g  are b u i l t  i n t o  khe t t x i s t i ng  
theory ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i s  r ev i s ion .  (For example, many of t h e  
t h e o r i e s  of p r a c t i c e  used by s c i e n t i s t s  i nco rpora t e  inqu i ry  as a 
c e n t r a l  va lue ,  and inc rease  the l i k e l i h o o d  of theory  r e v i s i o n .  1 
4 .  The mre t h e  s i t u a t i o n  makes disconf i rming  evidence avai l .able ,  
t h e  more l i k e l y  is  r e v i s i o n  of the  theory.  
i f  my theory  is  inaccura t e ,  b u t  I get no feedback Prom the 
environment to  a ler t  m e  to  t h e  problem, I may int-erp-oxat the 
exper ience  as f u r t h e r  conf i rmat ion  o f  t h e  theo ry ' s  validity.) 
(In other w~rdsP 
5. The greater t h e  arnount of ambiguity,  confusion,  infamat:ion 
overload and stress t h a t  an ind iv idua l  is experlewcinq, the 
less l i k e l y  i s  r e v i s i o n  of the  ope ra t inq  theory.  
over load  an  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c o g n i t i v e  a id  performance capabilities 
i n c r e a s e s  tho  i n c e n t i v e  t o  s o l v e  problems i n  t h e  simplest possible 
way-usually by r e l y i n g  on a theory  t h a t  is welJ:-learned, rather 
than  searching  f o r  new ones. 1 
Omything t h a t  
To aumnarizer 
1. Ind iv idua l s  develop over  t h e  course  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s  t h e o r i e s  
f o r  a c t i o n ,  i nc lud ing  a theory-in-use which informs a l l  o f  
t h e i r  behavior ,  and an espoused theory,  which guides  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  pe rcep t ion  o f  s e l f .  
2. An i nd iv idua l ' s  t h e o r i e s  f o r  a c t i o n  may c o n t a i n  errors and 
gaps, b u t  be designed i n  such a way as to  prevent  t h e  person 
from recogniz ing  t h e  problems. 
3. m e n  i f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  does recognize  problems i n  the theory- 
in-use,  s/he can alter t h e  theory  only  wi th  cons ide rab le  e f f o r t  
and t i m e .  
4.  In order to perform i n  s p e c i f i e d  practice domains, i n d i v i d u a l s  
davelop ' t h e o r i e s  o f  practice'. I n  some areas--usual ly  areas 
t h a t  are highly  t e c h n i c a l  or unique to t h e  practice domain- 
those t h e o r i e s  r e p r e s e n t  additions to r a t h e r  than r e v i s i o n s  in 
the pre-existing theory-in-use. 
i s s u e s  of how an i n d i v i d u a l  relates to  and works wi th  o the r s -  
l e a r n i n g  is l i k e l y  to  be much more d i f f i c u l t  because it r e q u i r e s  
In o t h e r  a reas -pa r t i cu la r ly  
45 
E. 
r e v i s i o n s  to  p re -ex i s t ing  p a t t e r n s .  I n  t h e  former areas, t h e  
theory  of p r a c t i c e  is more l i k e l y  to bc dominated by t h e  
theory  o f  p r a  
produce a ' t heo ry  of t h e  s i t ua t ion ' - - a  shor t - te rm set: af goals, 
assumptions, s k i l l s  and outcomes for use i n  a s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n .  
6.. There is  always a dilemma a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  d e c i s i o n  to r e v i s e  
a theory  {at any o f  t h e  t h r e e  l e v e l s ) :  is it more P . , C Q W ~ ~ C  and 
e f f i c i e n t  to cont inue  to  implement t h e  p r e s e n t  theory ,  BP is it 
more e f f i c i e n t  t o  r e v i s e  t h e  theo ry  i n  order to carreb=t i t s  
errors and d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
7. Revis ion is mre l i k e l y  under c o n d i t i o n s  of (a) Xow stress and 
overload,  (b) a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e l e v a n t  feedback, fc$ i n q u i r y  
s k i l l s  built i n t o  the  e x i s t i n g  theory.  
8 .  Theory-revision is less l i k e l y  when a theory  i s  csxaQra.7. kcj a n  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  self-esteem, when it is over learned ,  and i~ crisis 
s i t u a t i o n s  which overwhelm t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cogmit lve and 
performance c a p a c i t i e s .  
The Problems o f  On-Line Theory Revis ion 
The a i r  a c c i d e n t  cases cited above--like many o t h e r  cases in which 
crew errors occur-al l  occur red  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  c a p t a i n  (or t h e  
e n t i r e  crew) was o p e r a t i n g  on  a f a u l t y  theo ry  of the s i t u a t i o n ,  and was 
over looking  data t h a t  raised q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  that theory.  
I have a l r e a d y  suggested t h a t  t h e  TOS arises from t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between 
t h e  pilot 's theory of practice (TOP) and s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s ,  
TOS is i n  error, w e  can argue  t h a t  t h e  a n s  
When the 
s to  t w o  basic q u e s t i o n s  
TOS error a v a i l a b l e  bn t h e  environment? 
ror@ is t h e s e  o t h e r  
s informat ion?  
t i o n  t h a t  they  do n o t  have, i s  it 
le in format ion  
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The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of information to  d o t o c t  error is necessary ,  but 
not sufficient. Many questions about availability of information go t o  
des ign  i s s u e s  - t h e  des ign  o f  a i r c r a f t  and a i r c r a f t  i n s t rumen ta t ion ,  t h e  
des ign  o f  a i r  c o n t r o l l e r  systems, t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a c c u r a t e  and useab le  
manuals and c h e c k - l i s t s ,  etc. 
ment a n d . i n t e r p e r s o n a 1  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
which occurred  i n  a DC-8 s h o r t l y  be fo re  it crashed i n t o  a mountains 
But some q u e s t i o n s  go to  i s s u e s  ~b manage- 
Take t h e  fo l lowing  conversa t ion ,  
F i r s t  o f f i c e r :  
Captain:  No, 40 DME, you ' re  a l l  r i g h t .  
We should be a l i t t l e  h ighe r  here ,  s h o u l d n ' t  we? 
The f i r s t  o f f i c e r  w a s  correct; t he  c a p t a i n  w a s  wrong. Both were k i l l e d  
because t h e  c a p t a i n  cont inued t o  r e l y  on h i s  f a u l t y  TOS. The c a p t a i n ' s  
TOP d i d  n o t  lead him t o  test t h e  p o s s i b l e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r ' s  
suggest ion.  The c a p t a i n  was fo l lowing  a time-honored precedent2 leaders 
i n  a l l  sorts of  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  reject subord ina te  ques t ion ing  of  t h e i r  
b e l i e f s  day i n  and day ou t .  It enables them t o  g e t  on wi th  implementing 
t h e i r  c u r r e n t  TOS, r a t h e r  t han  having to d e l a y  and test  its v a l i d i t y .  
A cons ide rab le  body o f  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  theor ies - in-use  he ld  by  managers 
and p r o f e s s i o n a l s  sugges t s  t h a t  it is normative f o r  them to  respond to  
ques t ion ing  or c o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  TOS by defending  it r a t h e r  t han  
i n q u i r i n g  i n to  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  error. Even i n  s i tua t ions  where t h e  
s t a k e s  are not so high  nor so irrevocable as i n  a i r  t r a f f i c  s a f e t y ,  t h e  
costs can be se r ious .  
unacceptable. 
In  t h e  c o c k p i t  of a n  air carrier, t h e  costs are 
That sugges t s  t w o  impor tan t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  TOPS that 
t r a i n i n g  programs should seek to produce i n  f l i g h t  crews: 
1. Whenever a member of a f l i g h t  crew senses t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  crew's o p e r a t i n g  TOS may lead to s i g n i f i c a n t  error, 
t h a t  member has  a p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  raise t h e  issue and 
request t h a t  t h e  TOS be tested. 
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2. Whenever a member of  a f l i g h t  crew is challenged by another 
about t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  h i s h e r  operat ing 
t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  error, t h a t  member has a pos i t i ve  
to  seek infornat ion to t h e  v a l i  
Those pro may seem reasonable enough, bu t  they are 
to  implement, for t w o  reasons: 
1. The proposi t ions are much easier to adopt a t  the  level of  
espoused theory than theory-in-use, because they requi re  
wil l ingness  and s k i l l  i n  confrontation, inquiry,  and 
conflict-management t h a t  crew members may not  have. 
There is a problem of how to design a management system 
which i n s i s t s  t h a t  t he  capta in  has  a pos i t i ve  obl iga t ion  
to inqui re  when challenged, bu t  also has t h e  au thor i ty  
to make binding decisions.  
2. 
The problems are re l a t ed ,  because both requi re  t h a t  f l i g h t  crew 
menbers have a set of management and in te rpersonal  s k i l l s  which are 
r a r e l y  observed i n  any organizat ional  s e t t i ng .  Basically,  they requi re  
t h e  a b i l i t y  to combine advocacy (behavior which advocates one's b e l i e f s ,  
i 
values and opinions) with inquiry (behavior which seeks to test t h e  
v a l i d i t y  of one 's  beliefs, behavior, and values) . 
are o f t e n  perceived as polar opposites--with the  implicat ion t h a t  it 
Advocacy and inquiry 
is impossible to do both a t  the  same time. 
managers is cons is ten t  with t h e  po la r  opposi te  theory-it is rare to f ind  
managers who a good a t  both. But there  are some. And both s k i l l s  are 
essential i n  a cockpit. 
Empirical observation of 
It is e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  a l l  members of a f l i g h t  
efs and advocate t h e i r  view of t h e  
i n  very weak advmcacy 
captain' s response 
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make himself appear foolish by questioning the judgment of an experienced 
pilot who was familiar with the area). Supose that each had an operating 
TOP which led them to combine advocacy and inquiry. 
conversation might have been: 
An alternative 
First officer: I'm really concerned about whether our altitude 
is safe. What leads you to think we're o.k.? 
Captain: 
Theories of practice, pilot skills and cockpit norms that favor high 
I think we're 0.k. at 40 DME, but what's your concern? 
levels of advocacy and inquiry can help to ensure that crewmembers 
communicate effectively whenever someone in the crew senses error. An 
additional step is to train crewmembers to develop TOP'S which call for 
testing and inquiry whenever there is ambiguity or anomaly in their current 
TOS. That is, whenever the crew recognizes that something is happening 
that does not completely fit their theory of the situation, they need to begin 
asking questions like, 'Could we be mistaken?' 'Is there some other 
explanation for what's happening?' 'Is there any information we have (or 
can obtain) to help us understand the situation?' 
For example, consider the case of a 727 which crashed because the 
flight crew did not recognize the nature of their problem. 
inadvertantly failed to turn on the pitot heaters. When the pitot heads 
became blocked by atmospheric icing, they gave erroneously high airspeed 
readings. The crew was very surprised by the high airspeeds, but 
attributed them to unusual weather conditions and the fact that the plane 
They had 
was flying light. 
indicators were erroneous, although the plane's altitude should have 
alerted them that such high airspeeds were improbable or impossible. 
They did not consider the possibility that the airspeed 
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The sounds of a stall warning were mistaken for a Mach buffet (partly 
because the crew had just heard an erron 
situation, a disaster might have 
question the puzzling result by askin 
be wrong?" 
C. 
Anomalous or confusing situations tend to overload flight crews. 
Theory-revision and Management of Human Resources 
Over- 
load increases the likelihood of error. 
resources becomes a critical factor in aviation safety. It is precisely 
in crisis situations that the demands on both information-processing and 
performance skills are highest. 
to ensure that each member of the crew is performing effectively and 
The optimal use of available human 
In those situations, a flight crew needs 
working on the right set of tasks for the situation. 
tasks are defined and allocated constitutes a set of role definitions for 
a given moment (and those role definitions are one aspect--often implicit-- 
of the crew's theory of the situation). 
The way in which 
The flight situation makes very high demands on the role system-- 
simultaneously demanding high levels of role clarity (so that everyone 
is clear about their tasks) and role flexibility (so that tasks may be 
shifted or re-allocated as changes in the situation warrant). 
A role is a set of activities or performances that are defined by 
the expectations of 'role-senders'--persons who have expectations about 
how a role-occupant will pe rm in the role. Role-senders for an airline 
captain include the captain himself, other members of the flight crew, the 
passengers, airline management, air controllers, other airline pilots, etc. 
der has expectations for how a captain is to behave (although 
those expectations vary greatly in breadth, specificity and clarity among 
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different role-senders) and has the potential to exert influence on the 
captain (the amount varying greatly among different role-senders: the 
captain usually pays much closer attention to air controllers than to ~ 
passengers). Role clarity exists when the expectations are well-defined 
and there is agreement among those role-senders who are significant for 
a particular situation. 
exists. 
conflict. 
of the flight crew need to have mutual role expectations that are clear 
If the expectations are vague, then role ambiguity 
If the expectations conflict with one another, there is role 
To avoid role ambiguity and conflict in the cockpit, the members 
and mutually understood. 
problems can lead to serious errors. Those problems include excessive 
role restriction, inappropriate role differentiation, errors in managing 
interdependence, and problems in managing role boundaries. 
When this does not occur, a variety of role 
1. Role restriction 
Excessive role-restriction is the common result of over-controlling 
management styles. Many individuals have great difficulty'making the 
transition from 'doing it themselves' to 'getting it done through managing 
others'. 
as they. In others, they are fearful that subordinates will make errors 
unless closely controlled. 
which creates a very restrictive role for subordinates. 
to succeed through over-control often fail, because thehr subordinates 
are unable to accomplish very much. Warwick (1975) describes in vivid, if 
depressing detail how such a management style pervades the U.S .  State 
Department and helps to produce enormously slow and cumbersome performance. 
The subordinates are 'disempowered' and prevented from making optimal use 
In many cases, they doubt that anyone else can do it as well 
The result is a controlling style of management 
Managers who try 
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of their skills and capacities. The manager's primary task is not to do 
it himself/herself, but to make the best possible use of available human 
resources. 
Ruffell Smith's (1979) simulator study of crew response to overload found 
that one source of errors in many crews was the captain's tendency to do 
too much by himself, and to overcontrol his crewmembers. For example, 
some captains attempted to fly the plane and command during a difficult, 
emergency condition. They became overloaded, while other members of the 
crew were underloaded. In other cases, the captain gave so many discrete 
orders that other crewmembers never finished important tasks because of 
constant interruptions. 
2. 
Role differentiation refers to the degree to which different roles 
Role differentiation and management of interdependence 
are clearly distinct from one another. 
or over-differentiate. 
It is possible to under-differentiate 
Under-differentiation leads to excessive overlap 
(too many people doing the same thing), which often coincides with sig- 
nificant gaps (some activities that no one is doing). 
I )  
A clear example i s  
the crew which permitted their 1011 to crash because everyone was worrying 
about the nose gear light, but no one was monitoring the plane's flight 
performance. The under-differentiation (too many people focusing on one 
problem) led easily to gaps (significant problems that no one focused on). 
Under-differentiation often leads to conflict--as people trip over each 
other, or resent one another's intrusions into their turf. 
which crashed into the mountain, the captain had apparently taken over the 
In the DC-8 
navigational role by developing his o m  personal approach plan, which he 
with anyone else. rtly before the accident, the first 
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officer asked the captain if he was planning to make a procedure turn. 
The captain replied, "No, I ... I wasn't going to." But the captain did not 
say what he was planning to do. The,first officer asked about the terrain, 
and the captain said, "Mountains everywhere." The first officer then asked, 
"We should be a little higher, shouldn't we?", but he did not have enough 
information about the captains plan to be sure. 
Overlap can have one advantage--redundancy can reduce the likelihood 
of error. 
into the roles of air pilots. 
about the areas in which redundancy is expected and needed, and the areas 
in which overlap is wasteful and hazardous. 
A number of such redundancies are planned into aircraft and 
What is important is that crews be clear 
Over-differentiation occurs when different roles are so completely 
distinct, that different individuals have great difficulty knowing what 
one another is doing. The risk is that they make erroneous assumptions 
about one another, and fail to communicate enough to test those assumptions. 
In the airline setting, that risk is particularly high between pilots 
and flight controllers, whose roles are highly differentiated. 
the interdependencies between the roles have been worked out over time and 
Many of 
have achieved high levels of precision and reliability. But some areas 
are not completely resolved (e.g., the responsibilities of pilots and 
controllers with respect to detecting and communicating possible conflicts 
among aircraft). An example of pilot-controller misunderstanding occurred 
in the case (discussed earlier) of the 727 which crashed on an approach. 
The captain believed that the controller had cleared him to an elevation 
of 1800 feet. 
the captain relied on the assumption that it was the controller's responsibility 
Even though his approach chart suggested a possible problem, 
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t o  be s u r e  t h a t  an  approach is nok given un le s s  it is aaf'e. The c r e w  had 
p l e n t y  of t i m e  to  re-check t h e  charts or t o  check a y a h  wi th  ground c o n t r o l ,  
b u t  d i d  no t  do SO. The plane  crashed,  k i l l i n g  everyom aboard. 
3. Boundary Management 
A ro le  is a set o f  t a s k s  de f ined  by t h e  expec ta t ions  of role-senders .  
Those expec ta t ions  can be seen  as d e f i n i n g  a 'Ix3undaryG maund t h e  role. 
Tasks i n s i d e  t h e  boundary are p a r t  of the  role: tasks cxtside of t h e  boundary 
are no t  part of t h e  role. 
and r o l e - f l e x i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  and iv idca l s  be able t o  re -def ine  
boundaries.  
bor:n:Xaries are i l l - d e f i n e d ,  or  because there is l i t t l e  agreement on t h e  
p..;'ocess for re -def in ing  boundaries.  Undax-d iPferen t ie~ion ,  for example, 
Role boundaries  axe never completely precise, 
Many of the role problems discussed above occur because t h e  
.is very  l i k e l y  to  occur when roles are ambiguous an6 hx ihda r i e s  are ill- 
defined.  
For a f l i g h t  crew to be e f f e c t i v e  uncficr anomalous or crisis cond i t ions ,  
they  need to be conscious of t h e  need for hoiindary c l a r i k y ,  and clear about 
t h e  legitimate ways i n  which role boundaries  may be redefined. 
is critical, because emergencies w i l l  o f t e n  r e q u i r e  very rapid role s h i f t s ;  
The latter 
t h e  crew needs a way t o  accomplish t h i s  without  producing confusion,  role 
r e s t r i c t i o n ,  or innappropr ia te  gaps and over laps .  
t o  t h e  problem--'role boundaries are whatever t h e  c a p t a i n  s a y s  they  are'--- 
i s  e f f e c t i v e  in producing r a p i d  s h i f t s ,  b u t  does no t  always guarantee  
correct s h i f t s .  On the o t h e r  hand, a system i n  which anyone has  t h e  r i g h t  
ae any time to resist or appeal the c a p t a i n ' s  d e c i s i o n s  would make rapid 
s h i f t  very d i f f i c u l t  to achieve.  It might lead to  good d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  
long-run, b u t  that is no 
One obvious approach 
i f  t h e  p l ane  c ra shes  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run. 
What is needed is a system t h a t  preserves t h e  c a p t a i n ' s  a u t h o r i t y  to  
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make binding  d e c i s i o n s ,  bu t  places a p o s i t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  an  o t h e r  crew 
members t o  raise ques t ions  o r  suggest  a l t e r n a t i v e s  when they perceive 
t h a t  t h e  c a p t a i n ' e  s t r a t en  might  lead to  sfqnificant error. 
i n  t u r n ,  need to va lue  such i n p u t  as part o f  t h e  help they expec t  from 
3 
Captains ,  
t he i r  f l i g h t  crew, r a t h e r  than r e j e c t i n g  it 
threat to t h e  command s t r u c t u r e .  
D. Train ing  i n  KLU-IE-.~~ Resource Mdnagement 
e. 
o u t  of hand or see ing  it as a 
The arguments i n  this paper imply a need to devote  more a t t e n t i o n  to 
topics t h a t  have been largely neglected i n  p i lo t  t r a i n i n g .  P i l o t s  need 
to u8:derstand t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  hcta een slituationv and t h e i r  own t h e o r i e s  
To.; p r a c t i c e ,   the^ need to approc iate t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between espoused 
theory  and theory-in-use, and Le able to  explore t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
discrepancy i n  t h e i r  own theories. 
of s k i l l  i n  i nqu i ry  and on- l ine  l ca rn ing ,  and they need to  l e a r n  t h e o r i e s  
of p i l o t i n g  t h a t  emphasize those :jkil.lS. They need a conceptual  understanding 
of t h e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  processes and role i s s u e s  t h a t  aze cri t ical  to the 
They need to u ~ - I ~ w s & A J ~  t h e  importance 
flight deck s i t u a t i o n ,  and they need practice and skill i n  implementing 
those  concepts.  
W e  have begun to develop educa t iona l  approaches to  accomplish similar 
goals i n  working wi th  o t h e r  p ro fes s iona l s ,  i nc lud ing  managers (Argyris ,  
1976, B o h a n ,  19761, lawyers (Bolman, 19781, educational.  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  
(Bolman, 1976),  and m i n i s t e r s  (Bolman and Gallos, 19791, All of the 
methods emphasize the importance of i n t e g r a t i n g  theory, s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ,  
and practice. The d e s i g n  of such t r a i n i n g  v a r i e s  w i th  t h e  l e a r n i n g  
con tex t  , 
1. 
b u t  always inc ludes  some ve r s ion  of the fol lowing elementas 
P resen ta t ion  of r e l e v a n t  theory  (e .g . ,  theory  about i nqu i ry  
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and learning, interpersonal skills, role dynamics, 
communication in small groups, etc.) 
2.  Discussion of case examples from the learner's experience 
(e.g., discussion by pilots of particularly challenging ' 
situations that they have faced), as a way to apply the 
theory and to encourage learners to reflect on their 
own practice. 
3. Simulation of practice problems, with the chance for 
discussion, feedback, and repeated practice. (As  an 
example, a crew could work through a crisis situation in 
a full-mission simulation. 
experience with assistance from faculty. 
practice the same situation again.) 
They would then discuss the 
Next they would 
The design of such training is a challenging but exciting task. 
Part of the challenge is creating effective training experiences. Another 
part of the challenge is integrating new experiences with existing training. 
A significant part of the challenge is that the training must begin to 
question traditional assumptions about management and superior-subordinate 
communications. Those questions go beyond the flight deck--the same 
questions can be raised about the entire training activity, and about the 
management of the airline. If the management patterns that lead to pilot 
error are the same patterns used at every level of management in an air- 
line (where they presumably also lead to error), then the question of 
training pilots in effective management of human resources is closely 
tied to the larger questions of organizational climate and human resource 
management for the entire system. 
Those are large and difficult questions, and many of the answers 
remain to be discovered. But I believe that the air transport industry 
has little choice--sooner or later those questions will have to be con- 
fronted. 
sooner. 
Personally, I would prefer to fly with the-airlines that do it 
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NOTES 
1. This  i s  a working paper red  t h e  
9 Fr an Management on the  F l i g h t  I t  
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